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PRIMARY JURISDICTION: 
THE NEED FOR BETTER COURT/AGENCY INTERACTION 
MICHAEL BOTEIN* 
The division of responsibility between courts and agencies, generally 
considered under the rubric of "primary jurisdiction," is often seen as a 
powerful force in shaping the administrative process. But some agen-
cies pay little attention to the doctrines involved and make little attempt 
to preserve their jurisdiction from judicial intervention.1 The interest of 
commentators in the doctrines therefore appears somewhat anomalous. 2 
Nevertheless, scholarly study has produced an excellent body of writ-
ing on the law of primary. jurisdiction.s Precisely because this material 
already exists, a further analysis of the often chaotic case law seems 
neither fruitful nor appropriate. Instead, after a very brief overview of 
the doctrines, this piece will consist of a preliminary study of how the 
courts and agencies actually interact, together with methods by which 
this interaction can be made more efficient. 
+ B.A., 1966, Wesleyan University; J.D., 19,69, Cornell University; LL.M., 1972, 
Columbia University; Associate Professor, Rutgers Law School, Newark. 
This article is based upon a report prepared by its author under the auspices of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). The Conference, however, 
does not in any way approve or evaluate its content, which is the sole responsibility of 
the author. 
1. See text surrounding notes 126-45 infra. 
2. This interest may spring from anyone of several causes. First, the commenta-
tors' concern may simply reflect an increasing public awareness of and interest in the 
functioning of administrative agencies. Thus, a number of "public interest" groups have 
begun to study in detail the functioning of administrative agencies. See, e.g., R. 
FELLMETH, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE OMISSION (1970) (Ralph Nader's study group 
on The Interstate Commerce Commission and Transportation) [hereinafter cited as 
FELLMETH]. At the same time, the Executive branch has become increasingly con-
cerned about the efficient functioning of the federal agencies. See PRESIDENT'S 
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK:. 
REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES 3-7 (1971). Moreover, as 
the nation's economy has become increasingly regulated, Congress has exempted more 
and more industries from the operation of the antitrust laws, an area in which the 
doctrines have come to playa highly significant role. See, e.g., Hale & Hale, Competi-
tion or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. 
REV. 46, 48-51 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Hale & Hale]. Finally, the federal courts 
face increasingly overloaded dockets. See, e.g., Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 
F.R.D. 229 (1972); Zeisel, Court Delay Caused by the Bar?, 54 A.B.A.J. 886 (1968). 
Accordingly, courts may be tempted to reduce congestion by funneling litigation into the 
administrative process. 
3. For a sampling of the excellent scholarly literature in this area, see notes 4, 7, 
14, 17 infra. 
867 
868 RUTGERS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 29 
I. THE DocTRINES AND THEIR DIFFICULTIES: 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The law of primary jurisdiction exists in a highly uncertain state today. 
Indeed, some observers4 have suggested that there really is no coherent 
law at all. This situation could arise only in a country like the United 
States which had developed the administrative process into a fine and 
artificial art. ~ The development of the various related doctrines natural-
ly tracks the development of the federal administrative agencies; as 
agencies grew in number and importance, their jurisdiction and poten-
tial conflicts with courts also increased. It is necessary to review the 
doctrines briefly, in order to clarify some of the problems facing courts 
and agencies. 
"Primary jurisdiction" actually includes at least four major doc-
trines: primary exclusive jurisdiction, true primary jurisdiction, stat-
utory exemptions, and agency immunizations.6 Under primary ex-
clusive jurisdiction, a court loses all power over a case, except the very 
limited ability to review any ensuing agency action. On the other hand, 
true primary jurisdiction gives an agency the initial opportunity to 
consider a legal issue or to find facts, but reserves for the court the 
ultimate power to render a judgment. 7 
A statutory exemption is simply a congressional act which bars 
specific causes of action against particular industries, most commonly 
under the antitrust laws. 8 An agency immunization has virtually the 
same effect of removing potential liability, but is not self-executing and 
must be secured from an agency.9 Statutory exemptions and agency 
immunizations thus are quite similar in terms of both policy and impact. 
As will be seen, statutory exemptions and agency immunizations in fact 
share a number of common features and often overlap.l0 
4. See Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1037, 1038-41 (1964) [here-
inafter cited as Jaffe]; Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: 
A Practical Approach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEO. L.J. 812, 818-23 (1967) 
[hereinafter cited as Kestenbaum]. 
5. A former prominent official in the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department 
thus recently commented-perhaps tongue-in-cheek-that the regulatory agency "is a 
unique American contribution to the history of public institutions." Baker, Competition 
and Regulation: Charles River Bridge Recrossed, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 159, 161 (1975). 
6. To a certain extent, this analysis tracks that of McGovern, Types of Questions 
Over Which Administrative Agencies Do Not Have Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA 
ANTITRUST SECIlON 57,61 (1958) [hereinafter cited as McGovern]. 
7. See text accompanying notes 51-58 infra. 
8. See text accompanying notes 24-31 infra. 
9. See text accompanying notes 37-50 infra. 
10. See text accompanying notes 25-63 infra. This analysis does not include, of 
course, the problem of federal preemption of state court action or the converse question 
of the extent to which state legislation can immunize conduct from the antitrust laws 
under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The latter issue is extremely important, 
since it functions very much like an express federal statutory exemption or administrative 
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A. Primary Exclusive Jurisdiction 
The original statement of "primary jurisdiction"-really primary ex-
clusive jurisdiction-came in the context of protecting ICC tariffs from 
scattergun collateral attacks in state courts. Primary exclusive jurisdic-
tion thus developed for purposes far' different than its most common 
application today as a defense in antitrust actions.l1 
The putative parent of the doctrine is Texas & Pacific Railway v. 
Abilene Cotton Oil CoP In fact, the Court there held only that an 
aggrieved shipper could not challenge in state court the validity of a 
railroad's tariff filing with the Interstate Commerce Commission, but 
instead had to commence a proceeding before the Commission. The 
Court reasoned that individual recoveries would permit de facto rebates 
to some shippers, encourage collusive lawsuits to give rebates, and thus 
create a lack of "uniformity" in rates. 1S 
Abilene has received numerous criticisms, which need not be repeated 
here. 14 Perhaps most important today, however, is that the doctrine 
was created to control private law contractual disputes, but now func-
tions mainly in the context of public law antitrust cases. Moreover, the 
immunization. Its dimensions, however, take it beyond the scope of this piece. For an 
excellent discussion of the problems in this area, see Handler, The Current Attack on the 
Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. I (1976). 
11. As noted above, primary exclusive jurisdiction is closely related to true primary 
jurisdiction. The following analysis separates the two concepts, however, in order to put 
them in an appropriate historical context. 
12. 204 U.S. 426 (1907). The Abilene debate had been foreshadowed in one of the 
Court's first decisions under the Sherman Act. In United States v. Trans-Missouri 
Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), a case usually cited for its adoption of "per 
se" standards for price-fixing arrangements, the Court concluded after a lengthy discus-
sion that the mere existence of the Interstate Commerce Commisssion did not immunize 
from the antitrust laws railroads which filed tariffs with it. Id. at 314-27. Interestingly 
enough, the four dissenting justices argued that merely filing a tariff with the Commis-
sion immunized all actions under it from the antitrust laws. Id. at 343, 363-69. (White, 
Field, Gray & Shiras, n., dissenting). 
13. See 204 U.S. at 440-46. In a companion case, the Court held that failure to post 
rate schedules, in violation of the Act, did not vitiate the Abilene principle. Texas & 
Pac. Ry. v. Cisco Oil Mill, 204 U.S. 449 (1907). 
14. The Court reached its decision not because the issues required it, but rather 
because it unilaterally decided to do so. The Court thus ignored several major procedur-
al objections, 204 U.S. at 434-35, and pushed on to decide a point which had been 
neither briefed nor argued. See von Mehren, . The Antitrust Laws and Regulated 
Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 67 HARv. L. REV. 929, 932-33 (1954) 
[hereinafter cited as von Mehrenl. Moreover, the Court's great emphasis on "uniformi-
ty" may have been misplaced, for the possibility of many inconsistent results probably 
was quite remote. C/. Convisser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationaliza-
tions, 65 YALE L.J. 315, 322-25 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Convisser]. Similarly, 
collusive lawsuits would have been a rather expensive and complicated way for railroads 
to give de facto rebates to favored customers. Some commentators thus have character-
ized Abilene as a blatant exercise in judicial legislation. See, e.g., Schwartz, Primary 
Administrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion 0/ Litigants, 41 GEO. LJ. 495, 497 
(1953) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Primary Jurisdiction]. 
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Court's fears of inconsistent results in Abilene may have made sense in 
1907 but are less valid today. The modern class action, despite recently 
imposed limitations,15 provides uniform treatment for similarly situated 
parties. A properly supervised class action thus would give as much 
uniformity as would the ICC, and also preserve judidal jurisdictionY 
The Court soon expanded the ICC's primary exclusive jurisdiction 
beyond tariffsY And the Court later held Abilene required primary 
exclusive ICC jurisdiction over motor carriers as well as rail carriers.18 
Moreover, as the Court expanded the scope of the ICC's primary exclu-
sive jurisdiction, it also created several exceptions to it-some of which 
have continuing vitality today. First, the Court did not find primary 
exclusive jurisdiction where an action challenged conduct which the 
ICC could not regulate. l9 The Court also allowed actions against 
15. The strict notice requirements on class actions imposed by Eisen v. Carlisle & 
lacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), would not seem to be difficult to meet in a case such as 
Abilene. The potential litigants in Abilene were few in number and readily identifiable 
by company records. Eisen requirements might not be met in suits involving potentiaIly 
large, unidentified groups of litigants, as in suits involving the FCC and SEC. The mOre 
difficult hurdle naturally would be establishing that each class member had suffered at 
least $10,000 damages required under Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 
(1973 ). 
16. Furthermore, the nature of the railroad industry has changed fundamentally 
since 1907. Because of competition from motor trucks and the effect of World War II, 
the railroad industry has lost its natural monopoly status and therefore may need less 
intensive regulation. ct. Phillips, Railroad Mergers: Competition, Monopoly, and 
Antitrust, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. I, 15-17 (1962). The Court conveniently overlooked 
this consideration when it applied Abilene to suits against motor carriers. See generally, 
T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 468-80 (1959). Congress thus probably 
could have abolished the ICC and allowed competition as well as class actions to control 
railroad charges. 
17. In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad v. United States ex reI. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 
U.S. 431 (1910), the Court held that the ICC had exclusive jurisdiction over a railroad's 
allocation of cars to coal companies, even though the carrier had not filed its regulations 
with the Commission in the first place. See also Jaffe, Primary lurisdiction Reconsid-
ered; The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 582-83 (1954). This position 
seems questionable at best. If a carrier's practice is not before the ICC by way of a 
tariff filing, the Commission can act only by way of an affirmative investigation-a 
practice of which it is not terribly fond. See FELLMETH, supra note 2, at 11-13. To a 
certain extent, the Pitcairn Court may have been influenced by the fact that the ICC in 
fact had undertaken an investigation. See 215 U.S; at 494-95. Nevertheless, the 
possibility that an agency may act should not give it exclusive jurisdiction automatically. 
18. See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959). Four justices dissented 
on the ground that the ICC did not have as appropriate remedies for motor shippers 
as for rail shippers. Id. at 481-84 (Black, Douglas, Warren, and Clark, JJ., dissenting). 
But see Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-Ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1962) 
(Court seemed to indicate that the ICC has only primary as opposed to exclusive juris-
diction over motor carriers). 
19. The Court was somewhat unclear as to whether this exception covered conduct 
which the Commission did not regulate or only conduct which the Commission could not 
regulate. In United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 
103-05 (1913), the Court allowed the Justice Department to bring an antitrust suit based 
on a conspiracy which ultimately resulted in the fixing of prices in tariffs filed with the 
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conduct violative of the ICC's regulations, as opposed to attacks on the 
validity of the regulations.20 Furthermore, the Court at one time recog-
nized an exception for some pure "common law" right&.21 Finally, the 
Court vacillated in applying primary exclusive jurisdiction to cases 
which involved judicial "construction" of tariffs22 or statutes. 23 
There is clearly a need for doctrines to adjust tensions between 
courts and agencies, but the doctrine of primary exclusive jurisdiction is 
riddled with exceptions and about as forgiving to litigants as Attila the 
Hun. Although there appear to be no immediate solutions, it is at least 
possible to approach the problem more analytically, as suggested in 
Section II. 
ICC. The Court seemed to reason that government could attack conduct which led to 
the tariff, as opposed to the tariff itself. See also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 
U.S. 439 (1945). But in Midland Valley Railroad v. Barkley, 276 U.S. 482 (1928), the 
Court held that the ICC's failure to act in a given area where it clearly had jurisdiction 
precluded private lawsuits. This apparent distinction between inability and disinclination 
to regulate seems a bit anomalous, since both produce the same result. Moreover, 
allowing court action where an agency fails to act need not prejudice the agency. A 
court presumably will defer to an agency's exercise of a previously dormant power. 
20. See, e.g., Pennsylvania R.R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 237 U.S. 121, 131-32 
(1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. International Coal Mining Co., 239 U.S. 184, 196-97 
(1913). Although perfectly reasonable under Abilene's notion of "uniformity," this 
approach clearly was inconsistent with the later theory of "expertise," since it deprived 
the ICC of a chance to apply its supposedly specialized skills to the meaning of its own 
regulations. See text accompanying notes 66-69 infra. 
The lower federal courts later-and perfectly logically~xtended this principle to 
violations of agency authorizations. See, e.g., World Airways, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, 
Inc., 349 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st Cir. 1965); CAB v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 179 F.2d 
622, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1950). This type of holding appears related to the notion that 
exclusive jurisdiction does not exist where the agency itself is the plaintiff in a suit. 
21. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sonman Shaft Co., 242 U.S. 120, 125-26 (1916); Eastern 
Ry. of N.M. v. Littlefield, 237 U.S. 140, 144-45 (1915). 
22. At first, the Court consistently seemed to reject this type of exception, on the 
theory that an apparently simple question of tariff construction actually might involve 
complex issues of economics and technology. Loomis v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 240 U.S. 
43 (1916); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. American Tie & Timber Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1914). But 
just a few years after these cases, the Court decided that the meaning of a tariff raised an 
issue which was "solely one of construction .... " Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Mer-
chants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 294 (1922). When the Court later cut down on the 
scope of the exception in United States v. Western Pacific Railroad, 352 U.S. 59 (1956), 
the ICC on remand applied precisely the same general type of standards in construing 
the tariff as a court would have. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
ACTION 130 (1965). 
23. In International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 238-
39 (1971), the Court held that the question of whether a union member had received a 
fair hearing under the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act was within 
judicial competence and that the NLRB had no superior competence. 
There seems to be more support for this position than the position on tariffs. See note 
22 supra. While an agency may have some expertise in construing regulations promul-
gated by it or tariffs approved by it, the judiciary has the final authority to give an 
authoritative construction to a statute. For an unusual variation on this theme, see 
Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 192-94 (1969). 
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B. Statutory Exemptions and Agency Immunizations 
The most difficult issues in this area arise in the context of antitrust 
suits, for the theories behind regulation and antitrust are naturally 
antithetical: regulation emphasizes governmental control of business; 
antitrust relies on the market place. Although the basic regulatory and 
antitrust schemes evolved at roughly the same time toward the end of 
the nineteenth century,24 the Court has recognized very properly that 
they represent "two regimes. "211 Professor Handler thus has noted that 
the "two basic questions" in this area are "what particular mix of 
competition and regulation is best calculated to serve the public interest 
in connection with any given business activity ... " and "how this 
detennination should be made in any given instance."26 Section II 
addresses itself primarily to this second question. Since administrative 
agencies often apply anticompetitive standards, statutory exemptions 
and agency immunizations may result in approval of anticompetitive 
conduct;27 every such decision is thus at least potentially anticompeti-
tive.28 
Some observers believe that competition essentially is dead in this 
country and that the nation thus simply should accept increased regula-
tion of industry. 29 Other observers have more faith in the future of 
competition, however, and thus oppose the potentially anticompetitive 
effects of exclusive agency jurisdiction. so Indeed, the commentators 
have appeared diametrically opposed as to whether regulation or compe-
tition is to be preferred.St 
The easiest cases naturally are those in which the status of an agency's 
immunization power, and an industry's statutory exemption, are clear. 
When a court finds that an agency could not conceivably immunize a 
24. King, The "Arguably Lawful" Test of Primary Jurisdiction in Antitrust Litiga-
tion Involving Regulated Industries, 40 TENN. L. REV. 617, 617 & n.l (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as King]. 
25. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 310 (1963). 
26. Handler, Regulation Versus Competition, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 194 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Handler]. Professor Handler would leave the task of answering the 
second question to the Congress--a perhaps overly optimistic solution. 
27. In Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973), for 
example, the Court held that the CAB had immunized conduct otherwise violative of the 
antitrust laws by approving it. 
28. For a discussion of the outcome-determinative nature of such assertions of 
exclusive jurisdiction, see Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated 
Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARv. L. REV. 436, 464-75 
(1954) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Legal Restriction]. 
29. Cf., e.g., Stokes, A Few Irreverent Comments About Antitrust, Agency Jurisdic-
tion, and Primary Jurisdiction, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 537-39 (1964). 
30. See, e.g., Jacobs, Introductory Comments, 20 FED. B.J. 4, 4-5 (1960); Schwartz, 
Legal Restriction, supra note 28, at 471-75. 
31. Cf. Hale & Hale, supra note 2, at 51-52; Schwartz, Legal Restriction, supra note 
28 at 437-38. 
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violation of the antitrust laws, the court need not consider whether the 
agency must pass on the conduct.32 Conversely, many industries oper-
ate under express statutory exemptions from the antitrust laws.ss The 
existence of an exemption thus creates a legal situation very similar to 
primary exclusive jurisdiction; the jurisdiction of the courts is effectively 
destroyed and all control of the industry is vested in an agency.34 
The situation becomes infinitely more complicated, however, either 
where the scope of an exemption is unclear or where an implied exemp-
tion may exist. Congress is often deliberately or carelessly vague in its 
language.311 Accordingly, the statutes behind possible exemptions are 
usually quite cryptic:86 
In this area of comparatively free decision, the courts have established 
virtually no standards at all. To be sure, even A bilene started from a 
presumption against implied repeals37-a notion to which the Court 
consistently has given only lip service. 38 Beyond this obviously genera] 
statement, however, the Court has developed few or no real standards in 
the course of making decisions regarding implied repeals. To be sure, it 
occasionally has suggested that immunization power should tum on 
whether an agency's regulatory scheme is sufficiently "pervasive." But 
the Court has vacillated in using even this general test, applying or 
ignoring it as it has wished to retain or relinquish judicial jurisdiction.39 
32. See Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458, 
464-71 (1960); United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196,204-06 
(1945). In both cases the Court held that although the defendants might claim a limited 
form of antitrust immunity to legitimize the creation of their otherwise illegal cartels, 
Congress had meant to immunize acts with illegal purposes. 
33. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 741, 767-88 (1963), 
devotes more than twenty pages to listing the staggering number of special exemptions 
which private interest groups have obtained from Congress. As his laundry list 
effectively demonstrates, there is no particularly consistent or coherent pattern to the 
granting of exemptions. 
34. Note, Antitrust Immunity in the Communications Industries, 44 VA. L. REV. 
1131, 1132 (1958), views statutory exemptions and agency immunization power as 
different from and "supplemented by" the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. As noted 
before, regulation and competition usually exist as alternatives. See text accompanying 
notes 24-31 supra. Accordingly, some form of administrative structure almost invariably 
goes along with the grant of an express exemption. See, e.g., United States v. Borden 
Co., 308 U.S. 188, 199-200 (1939). 
35. Congress generally obfuscates administrative enabling statutes, simply because it 
may have absolutely no idea of how to handle a problem and thus wishes to dump it-as 
well as any resulting political flak-into the lap of a comfortably removed administrative 
agency. For an excellent example of how Congress ended in total futility when 
attempting to allocate radio frequencies around the country, see W. JONES, LICENSING OF 
MAJOR BROADCAST FACILITIES BY TIlE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 4 
(1962). 
36. C/. Comment, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries: The Panagra Decision 
and Its Ramifications, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 593, 595-98 (1963). . 
37. See Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 436-37 (1907). 
38. Cf., e.g., United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939). 
39. In United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334, 348-51 (1959), the 
Court held that the Federal Communications Commission's activities in licensing televi-
874 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29 
The cases40 indicate that the Court tends to look to an agency's 
effectiveness in protecting some public interest other than competition. 
Although the Court has deliberately eschewed dealing in these terms 
explicitly,H its use of this standard has been apparent. 42 This obviously 
sion broadcasters did not constitute a "pervasive regulatory scheme," on the grounds that 
the Commission controlled only limited aspects of licensees' operation and left them 
considerable discretion in the conduct of day-to-day activities. See also United States v. 
Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321,350-52 (1963). 
40. For example, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the 
Court held that an Exchange ruling against member firms having direct telephone lines 
with nonmember firms was not immunized from the antitrust laws. The Court went 
through the usual litany of emphasizing the role of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in policing stock exchanges. But it held that the Exchange had failed to 
give valid reasons for its failure to hold a hearing. See id. at 361-63. The Court 
appeared to be concerned more with due process than with immunization, as not only the 
dissent, see id. at 367-69 (Stewart & Harlan, JJ., dissenting), but also other observers 
pointed out. Ct. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 
941-43 (5th Cir. 1971) (issue of whether plaintiff had received fair hearing before 
delisting of its stock dealt with in pure procedural due process terms). 
It thus came as less than a surprise when just ten years later the Court appeared to 
tum ninety degrees. In Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 409 U.S. 289 (1973), 
the Court held that the Commodity Exchange Commission had a form of true primary-
as opposed to primary exclusive-jurisdiction to review the Mercantile Exchange's 
transfer of a membership without hearing, noting that: 
This judgment [to stay the action] rests on three related premises: (1) that it 
will be essential for the antitrust court to determine whether the Commodity 
Exchange Act or any of its provisions are "incompatible with the maintenance 
of an antitrust action" ... ; (2) that some facets of the dispute between Ricci 
and the Exchange are within the statutory jurisdiction of the Commodity Ex-
change Commission; and (3) that adjudication of that dispute by the Com-
mission promises to be of material aid in resolving the immunity question. Id. 
at 302. 
The Court distinguished Silver on the grounds that the statute arguably immunized the 
Mercantile Exchange's conduct and that the CEC had a stronger duty than the SEC to 
supervise membership in exchanges. See id. at 303-06. 
The Ricci decision may very well make sense because of the difference between the 
SEC and the CEC. The Court may have recognized that the latter commission 
supervised the exchanges' activities more closely. But ct. Note, 33 OHIO STATE LJ. 209, 
216-17 (1972). Nevertheless, the Court's suggestion that the statute might immunize 
the activities of commodities exchanges seems inconsistent with its treatment of the case 
as one involving true primary jurisdiction, and thus appropriate for a stay rather than a 
dismissal. See 409 U.S. at 302. 
The Court turned another ninety degrees away from Silver in Gordon v. New York 
Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659 (1975), where it held that the Exchange's now defunct 
rate-setting was immune from the antitrust laws. The Court ostensibly based its holding 
just on the fact that the SEC had clear, direct, and effective statutory authority over the 
Exchange's rate practices. Indeed, the Court went to great lengths at the end of its 
opinion to state that it was not considering the existence of "pervasive" jurisdiction, but 
only whether the SEC had the requisite statutory power. See id. at 688-89. Justice 
Douglas, however, concurred solely on the grounds that the SEC had done an effective 
job of regulation .. Id. at 691-96. 
The Court as a whole was nevertheless highly concerned with the history of the 
Exchange's rate practices and the rigor of the SEC's regulation. See id. at 668-82. The 
Court thus spent the major part of its opinion exploring the history of Exchange 
practices and SEC regulation. 
41. See, e.g., id. at 689-90. 
42. See note 40 supra. The Court apparently found effective regulation lacking in 
Silver, arguable in Ricci, and present in Gordon. 
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creates a certain amount of ad hoc and unpredictable decisionmaking. 
As Section II suggests, however, this may be not only inevitable, but 
also desirable. 
The Court thus has not produced any clear and consistent standards 
for finding immunization power. To be sure, a number of commenta-
tors seem little more convinced about their own tests than the Court's.43 
Indeed, perhaps the most honest recommendation is simply that the 
Court recognize that every immunization issue requires an almost ad hoc 
approach.44 
Even when an agency definitely does have power to immunize con-
. duct, it often is unclear whether an agency has taken enough action to 
invoke its immunization power for a particular firm. The Court thus 
has held that an agency's approval of contracts between regulated 
industries invoked immunization--<lespite the agency's plea that the 
Court apply the antitrust laws. 45 The Court thus was in the position of 
forcing more oversight of anticompetitive conduct down an agency's 
throat. 
Finally, it is unclear whether an agency may immunize retroactively 
conduct which has not been brought to its attention by means of tariff or 
other filings. Indeed, the Court has wavered on the issue and made 
apparently contradictory statements. 46 On the one hand, a requirement 
of prior approval may make sense; after all, failure to file shows a 
disrespect for law and the agency conceivably might disapprove the 
filing.47 On the other hand, a filing requirement may be formalistic, 
43. McGovern proposes that courts look to whether there is a need for special 
administrative expertise and uniformity. He limits this obviously rather general recom-
mendation with the comment-hopefully tongue-in-cheek-that his test is "nothing more 
finite than a pragmatic, working test as a criterion for the application of the doctrine." 
McGovern, supra note 7, at 67. On the other hand, Con visser suggests that the courts 
look solely to whether judicial intervention would interfere with agency operations-also 
a general standard. See Convisser, supra note 14, at 336-37. Perhaps most interesting 
of all, Hale & Hale develop a "mushroom principle," under which an agency would have 
exclusive jurisdiction over everything which it potentially might need to regulate in the 
future. Hale & Hale, supra note 2, at 57-58. 
44. See Fox, The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: A Reappraisal of the 
Role of the Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine, 2 MEMPHIS STATE L. REV. 296, 297 (1972). 
45. See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973). 
The CAB had made its request by way of an amicus brief. Id. at 409 (Burger & 
BIackmun, 11., dissenting). The reasons for the CAB's disavowal of this very substantial 
chunk of power were less than clear. The Board apparently feared that a holding like 
the majority's, however, would force it to use excessive care, which it felt it could not 
exercise with its present staff. Interview with member of Office of General Counsel, 
Civil Aeronautics Board, in Washington, D.C., February 24, 1975 [hereinafter cited as 
CAB Interview]. 
46. Compare Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 282 U.S. 213, 215 (1966) 
with Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400 U.S. 
62,69 (1970). 
47. See Fulda, A Critique of the Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA 
ANTITRUST SECTION 68, 72-73 (1958). 
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since an agency immunization may terminate antitrust liability.48 
A decision in favor of immunization power thus has a powerful 
impact upon the parties to a law suit. Immunization effectively may 
destroy a plaintiff's cause of action. If it has the requisite power, the 
agency often will immunize the conduct. Commentators have recog-
nized the outcome-determinative effect of agency immunization for a 
long time,4\1 and even the Court has appeared to note this. 50 
C. True Primary Jurisdiction and Referrals 
Despite the doctrines of primary exclusive jurisdiction, statutory ex-
emptions, and agency immunizations, this country's judicial system 
always has allowed a certain amount of concurrent jurisdiction between 
courts and agencies. 51 Indeed, the United States legal system not only 
permits but also encourages concurrent jurisdiction in some situations, 
as between the NLRB and the federal courts. 52 True "primary jurisdic-
tion" thus exists only where there is concurrent jurisdiction. In this 
situation, the question is which tribunal will proceed first, rather than 
which tribunal will proceed.53 To be sure, primary jurisdiction has 
some impact upon the outcome of a case; after all, if an agency uses its 
"expertise" to find facts, review under the substantial evidence rule will 
restrict a court's role greatly. 54 A court may well be able to refer a case 
in such a way, however, as to preserve unlimited review powers.5t\ 
The seminal as well as most illustrative case of true primary jurisdic-
tion is General American Tank Car Corp. v. El Dorado Terminal CO.56 
The shipper there brought a simple action for breach of contract, 
claiming that under the contract the carrier owed it all rebates received 
from railroads for shipping the plaintiff's products. The defendant 
argued that it could not pass along such rebates under the Interstate 
Commerce Act. The Court quickly went to the merits and held that the 
plaintiff was entitled under the contract to the rebates. However, it 
48. See King, supra note 24, at 631. 
49. Convisser, supra note 14, at 330-31; see Kestenbaum, supra note 4, at 814. 
Moreover, just giving the agency the power to find the facts in a case under a theory of 
primary jurisdiction gives the agency a good deal of power, since on judicial review-as 
opposed to a de novo trial-a court is much more restricted in its ability to make 
findings of fact. See also von Mehren, supra note 14, at 960-65. 
50. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353-54 (1963). 
51. See Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1053-54. 
52. See Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 529, 547-48 (1963). 
53. See Comment, New Twists on Old Wrinkles: Primary Jurisdiction and Regula-
tory Accommodation with the Antitrust Laws, 15 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 80, 93-94 
(1971). 
54. See von Mehren, supra note 14, at 946-47. 
55. See text accompanying note 124 infra. 
56. 308 U.S. 422 (1940). 
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decided to stay the proceeding and retain jurisdiction in order to give the 
ICC a chance to decide whether the rebates were legal in the first 
place. 57 The El Dorado holding thus creates a situation very different 
from primary exclusive jurisdiction. In an exclusive jurisdiction situa-
tion, the court's only role is to subject the agency decision to very limited 
substantive review, while in the true primary jurisdiction situation the 
court retains jurisdiction over the case and uses the agency decision as 
just one component in its own decision. The plaintiff thus retains its 
right to a judicial remedy, subject only to a possibly binding decision 
from the relevant agency.58 
Primary jurisdiction does have its own problems. It is not clear how 
closely an issue must be related to administrative expertise before a 
court should order a referral. 59 A fair reading of El Dorado indicates 
that the administrative issue need not be closely related to the lawsuit, 
however, since the ICC rulings there were relevant only to the legality of 
a part of a purely private contract. 60 Similarly, there is no statutory or 
administrative procedure for making a referral in an El Dorado situa-
tion.6i Accordingly, a more definite procedure for making these refer-
rals certainly would be useful. 62 
The El Dorado fonn of true primary jurisdiction promotes an easy 
relationship between courts, agencies, and litigants. Instead of produc-
ing the harsh result of outright dismissal, it merely stays the action until 
the agency has been heard. 
57. See id. at 431-33. The Court thus did not divest the jurisdiction of the district 
court, but only required that the court wait for the ICC determination before making any 
final decision. 
58. Schwartz, Primary Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 500-03, criticizes the practice 
of splitting up issues between court and agency, arguing instead that the court should 
decide the whole case. Although this might well be beneficial in terms of securing a 
speedier decision, the El Dorado formulation gives the court the benefit of a supposedly 
expert opinion and should not consume an undue amount of time unless the agency 
deliberately drags its feet. 
59. See McGovern, supra note 7, at 66. 
60. Indeed, to the extent that referral is based upon a desire to receive an agency's 
supposed "expertise," a close relation may not be necessary at all. See, e.g., Quigley v. 
Exxon Co., 34 AD. L.2d 891 (M.D. Pa., May 10, 1974). 
61. See Ailes, Some Procedural Problems of Primary Jurisdiction, 13 ABA ANTI-
TRUST SECTION 82, 84-85 (1958). 
62. See id. at 89-91. Ailes sets forth a model order of referral, specifying the issues 
on which the agency should pass. Issuance of such an order is no guarantee of agency 
action, however, since agencies have been known simply to turn up their noses at courts. 
See McQuade Tours, Inc., 50 C.A.B. 910 (1969). Nevertheless, this type of behavior 
appears to be quite rare, to say the least. As one agency attorney quite realistically 
pointed out, an agency does not like to offend a judge "particularly if a lot of our own 
litigation is pending there." Interview with member of Office of General Counsel, 
Securities & Exchange Commission, in Washington, D.C., December 4, 1974 [hereinafter 
cited as SEC]. 
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II. AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 
[Vol. 29 
As the preceding discussion indicates, the jargon of "primary jurisdic-
tion" actually lumps together many separate doctrines. In order to 
develop any useful conceptual model of judicial versus agency jurisdic-
tion, it therefore is essential to separate the radically different decision-
making situations which fall under the "primary jurisdiction" rubric. As 
noted in Section I, the four most common situations are statutory 
exemption, immunization by agency order, primary exclusive jurisdic-
tion, and true primary jurisdiction. The latter two situations obviously 
have the most in common as well as the greatest resemblance to tradi-
tional notions of primary jurisdiction; but there is considerable interplay 
among all four theories. 
In each situation, two main considerations are relevant: first, the 
appropriateness of judicial versus agency action, and, second, the specif-
ic factual context of the situation. Tension often exists among the 
various factors which comprise the two main considerations. Further-
more, although judicial action may appear perfectly appropriate, a 
particular situation may present countervailing considerations, such as a 
very explicit statutory exemption, agency immunization of the conduct 
in issue, or specific jurisdictional requirements. 
To be sure, improved judicial decisionmaking may not be the key to 
resolving fundamental tensions between regulation and competition, 
agencies and courts. Indeed, Professor Handler has broken from other 
commentators in suggesting that the answer lies with Congress through 
a thorough-going reevaluation and redefinition of present statutes.63 But 
although this type of clear-cut and definitive answer is attractive, it does 
not appear to be forthcoming in light of Congress' past lack of success 
in expeditious and thoughtful action. 'Moreover, under even a new 
statutory scheme the courts would retain ultimate responsibility for 
filling in gaps and dealing with unforeseen situations. 
A. Appropriateness of Judicial Versus Agency Action 
The first consideration is the relationship between agency and judicial 
action. To be sure, this is a very general and perhaps speciously 
overbroad concept. Indeed, too many commentators fall into the trap 
of attempting to construct a unified field theory for all court-agency 
relations. But the doctrines discussed in Section I are general by nature, 
and a broad discussion of the judicial role is therefore valid, so long as it 
also considers more specific issues. 
There are many possible justifications for judicial deference to admin-
istrative agencies. Some rationales may be questionable, however, and 
63. See Handler, supra note 26, at 204-06. 
1976] PRIMARY JURISDICTION 879 
all vary in weight from situation to situation. 
Perhaps the major bar to accurate analysis is simply that "primary 
jurisdiction" developed in 1907 for one purpose, but now serves totally 
different ones. Although the Abilene Court ostensibly was attempting 
to protect the rights of shippers as a class, it probab~y was more con-
cerned with insulating the then young ICC from other courts' en-
croachment. After all, the ICC as well as the administrative process 
was comparatively new and unpopular with some political groups.64 
Indeed, by contemporary standards the early ICC was an extraordinarily 
aggressive agency65 and ,thus easily made enemies. But the ghosts of anti-
agency bias have long since evaporated. To a very real extent, the 
courts thus use primary jurisdiction to protect agencies against non-
existent dangers. 
The most common and perhaps most questionable justification for 
judicial deference is that agencies develop special "expertise" which 
generalist judges presumably never can duplicate. 66 To be sure, a case 
should go to the forum which can deal with it most competently. But 
the much vaunted theory of agency expertise has become increasingly 
questionable for several reasons. Agency members come and go too 
quickly to develop much specialized knowledge.67 Too many perma-
nent and high level staffers may have only limited competence, simply 
because the private sector attracts the best and brightest. 68 Moreover, 
an agency's alleged "expertise" often consists of outdated gut reactions, 
rather than up-to-date empirical studies.69 Finally, and most signifi-
cantly, the courts have become increasingly restive with post-New Deal 
restrictions on judicial review. Some federal judges-particularly in the 
District of Columbia Circuit-have lived with agencies long enough to 
know and, occasionally, even articulate their deficiencies. 70 Judges 
know when an agency has been "captured" by the industry or industries 
64. See Schwartz, Legal Restriction, supra note 28, at 471. 
65. For an illustration, see Judge Friendly's contrast of early versus current ICC 
attitudes. H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES: THE NEED FOR 
BErrER DEFINITION OF STANDARDS 27-35 (1962). See also Jaffe, Primary lurisdiction 
Reconsidered: The Anti-Trust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 577 (1954), who maintains that 
the courts now are attempting to "repent their sins" from pre-New Deal days. 
66. The theory of administrative expertise did not enter the law, of course, until 
well after Abilene and other early cases initially had developed the concept of primary 
exclusive jurisdiction. See Jaffe, supra note 4, at 1041-43. 
67. See Hector, Problems 0/ the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 
69 YALE L.J. 931, 957 (1960). 
68. See Schwartz, Legal Restriction, supra note 28, at 473-74. 
69. Ct. FELLMETH, supra note 2, at 13-15. Indeed, all too often an agency's only 
hard information will consist of studies compiled by the very firms which the agency is 
charged with regulating, as a perusal of almost any major rulemaking docket will indicate 
quickly. 
70. See, e.g., Office of Communication of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 
F.2d 994, 1000-06 (D.C. Cir. 1966). After all, judges in and around the District of 
Columbia have the opportunity for frequent and substantial social and professional 
contact with high level agency personnel. 
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which it has been charged to regulate71 and thus accord less deference 
to these agencies. Indeed, some courts may have embarked upon a 
mission to rescue "captured" agencies by imposing the courts' concep-
tions of the public interest on them. If the courts are willing to 
restructure a prison's day-to-day activities,72 they presumably should 
find little difficulty in reviewing an agency's more visible actions. 
Expertise thus has become an increasingly weak reed upon which to 
rest agency jurisdiction, especially as to captured agencies. To be sure, 
agencies usually are the best qualified forums to pass on the conduct of 
firms which they police. But expertise should not keep any talismanic 
qUality. Instead, a court should use the procedures discussed in Section 
TIF3 to discover whether an agency has real competence in a particular 
case. 
A second rationale for agency jurisdiction, and Abilene's ostensible 
basis, is that court adjudication of individual disputes prevents "uni-
formity" in the treatment of a whole class. But Abilene probably was 
unfounded in its fear that individual and possible collusive actions 
would give some shippers de facto preferences over others, since only 
some shippers would recover. To be sure, national uniformity in poli-
cy-as opposed to individual case results-may be valuable to facilitate 
commercial and other transactions. As will be noted later,74 however, 
this consideration is quite different from the theory of uniformity under-
lying agency jurisdiction. 
Another possible justification for judicial deference is that agencies 
deliver speedier justice than courts. After all, one of the traditional 
reasons for creating agencies has been to expedite proceedings. 75 To be 
sure, some federal agencies perform the vital function of processing 
millions of comparatively small matters very efficiently. But any major 
adjudication is likely to proceed as torturously before an agency as 
before a court. An agency must decide whether to order a hearing in 
the first place78-a process which by itself can take three or four years. 77 
71. Ct. id. at 1003-04, 1008. 
72. Bazelon, Implemellting the Right to Treatment, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 742, 743-44 
(1969), turns this argument around in maintaining that courts can intervene in prison 
administration because of their past success in dealing with federal agencies. 
73. See text surrounding notes 146-62 infra. 
74. See text accompanying notes 91-99 infra. 
75. See, e.g., I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISB 39 (1958). In more 
recent years, however, Professor Davis appears to have become somewhat alarmed at the 
very speediness of some high volume agencies' low visibility decisionmaking. See K. 
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICB-A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 27-28 (1969). 
76. For example, 47 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1970) requires a complainant to persuade the 
Federal Communications Commission to issue a show cause order before even beginning 
a proceeding-a procedure common to most other agency statutes with cease and desist 
order provisions. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 45(b) (1970). Thus an aggrieved party in effect 
must win a motion for summary judgment in order to get a hearing-precisely the 
converse of traditional judicial procedure. 
77. For example, the FCC currently is more than three years behind in deciding 
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Thus, an additional decisional process is interposed before a case even 
goes to hearing. In addition, if a hearing is designated, an agency may 
not conduct it more expeditiously than a court. Despite recent attempts 
to upgrade their status,78 most administrative law judges still are not as 
qualified as most federal district court judges. Moreover, evidentiary 
and procedural rules are often the same in an agency as in a federal 
district court,79 thus creating the same potential delay as in a court. 
Thus administrative justice is not necessarily speedy. Indeed, the gener-
ation-long, Dickensian nature of some jurisdictional litigation often is 
partially the result of delay at the administrative as well as judicial 
level. 80 A general theory of administrative speed or efficiency therefore 
is not a sound basis on which a court should defer. Instead, a court 
should look to an agency's demonstrated competence in handling partic-
ular types of issues or cases. 
A fourth rationale might be that judicial action creates a conflict with 
another branch of the federal government, whether Congress, the Exec-
utive, or the "headless fourth branch."81 If this conflict existed, it 
would be far more dangerous than the analogous struggle between law 
and equity.82 After all, disputes within one branch are presumably less 
disruptive than those between branches. 
But although judicial action may create some conflict with agencies, 
it does not rise to the quasi-constitutional level of a "political question." 
Judicial action simply does not create the dangers with which the politi-
cal question doctrine is concerned. Agency jurisdiction comes from 
Congress, not from any direct constitutional source, and courts generally 
have "judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving 
the questions at issue. Very few cases involve "an initial policy 
determination" which the courts cannot make. Moreover, judicial ac-
tion does not express any "lack of respect due coordinate branches," 
usually does not interfere with any "political decision," and practically 
never creates conflicting views from different branches.83 If a court 
whether to grant hearings to parties filing petitions to deny the license renewals of radio 
or television stations. See, for example, the table in ACCESS, Feb. 9, 1976, at 20-21. This 
is rather anomalous in light of the fact that licenses have a duration of only three years. 
78. For example, in 1972 the Civil Service Commission changed the name of federal 
presiding officers from "hearing examiner" to "administrative law judge" in most cases. 
79. See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.201 et seq. (1975). 
80. See, e.g., Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363, 390·94 
(1973) (Burger & Blackmun, n., dissenting). See also Comment, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 
593, 602 (1963). 
81. 2 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF lliE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERN-
MENT, GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH, INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGEN-
CIES 4 (1949). 
82. See Schwartz, Primary Jurisdiction, supra note 14, at 507. 
83. These criteria are among those listed in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 
(1962), and still appear to be as definite an exposition of the political question doctrine 
as is likely to exist. 
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ignores an agency's regulatory scheme, it creates a conflict directly with 
the agency and only indirectly with the ultimate source of power, Con-
. gress or the Executive. The real danger of conflict thus arises only 
when a court flouts an agency policy which has been mandated affirma-
tively by either a congressional act or an executive order. Since many 
agency enabling statutes are no more specific than "the public inter-
est,"S4 this type of conflict seems quite rare. 
Moreover, experience in the enforcement of the antitrust laws reflects 
a long tradition of using diverse parties as well as forums to effectuate 
national policy. Here the Justice Department, the FTC, or private 
parties may be complainants, and the forum may be a federal district 
court or the FTC. The existence of three potential plaintiffs and two 
potential forums has not created many confusing or inconsistent results. 
Rather, this diversity appears to promote more effective enforcement of 
the laws. Different parties and forums have different concerns, for 
example, a private party and the Department. Only in very rare in-
stances must courts thus be concerned that their actions will create a 
serious conflict with another branch. 
A fifth possible justification for judicial deference is to reduce the 
federal courts' already overloaded docket. Courts may invoke agency 
jurisdiction for reasons similar to those behind requiring exhaustion of 
administrative remedies.85 This approach seems not only shortsighted, 
but also unproductive. The real source of overcrowded dockets today is 
diversity jurisdiction. 86 Transferring cases from courts to agencies thus 
can have only a very minimal impact on the judicial docket--especially 
where potential judicial review of administrative action exists. Finally, 
administrative cases raise inherently federal questions; accordingly, they 
should receive more favorable treatment than diversity cases. 
Still another rationale for agency jurisdiction might be that agencies 
are presumably more democratic than courts because they report direct-
ly to elected officials in the Congress or the Executive. Although 
agencies probably are more responsive than courts to the public's will, 
the distinction is one of degree rather than kind. After all, the Execu-
tive has the initiative in nominating all federal judges, and the Congress 
has the final power in confirming them. Pragmatically, both courts and 
agencies are insulated to varying degrees from direct popular pressure, 
since neither is subject to direct elections-an obviously desirable situa· 
tion in adjudicatory matters. Nevertheless, the greater isolation of the 
courts militates toward expanding, rather than contracting, their role in 
adjudicatory matters. 87 
84. E.g., 47 u.s.C. §§ 307(a), 309(a) (1970). 
85. See Public Uti\' Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539 (1958). 
86. For a proposal simply to abolish diversity jurisdiction, see H. FRIENDLY, 
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139 (1973). 
87. Indeed, this separation of adjudicatory and policymaking functions is precisely 
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A seventh and final justification for agency jurisdiction goes to reme-
dial power in two ways:, first, that agencies are more competent than 
courts in fashioning relief for broad classes, and second, that the legal 
system cannot tolerate different results from different forums. The 
question of agency competence in remedial matters rests upon basically 
the same assumptions as the "expertise" rationale discussed above.88 
These considerations are just as questionable in this context. Moreover, 
the courts have developed increasingly flexible powers since Abilene.s9 
As the Supreme Court itself has noted,90 the availability of Supreme 
Court review prevents wildly varying lower federal court standards. As 
with the expertise justification, a court therefore should not defer unless 
an agency shows that it is peculiarly qualified to administer relief in a 
particular case. 
The second part of this justification-the danger of inconsistent 
results by courts and agencies-is also subject to question. The amount 
of inconsistency might be extremely small and easily tolerated, D1 and in 
at least some instances the legal system already does accept different 
results by courts and agencies.92 To be sure, conflict between agency 
and court decisions should be minimized. In some situations, however, 
a court may act without danger of real conflict even though an agency 
has acted or may act. 
A court should be free to award damages where an agency can give 
only prospective relief. 93 A court should also be free to impose liability 
for conduct which an agency has not immunized or has not immunized 
retrospectively. 94 In both cases, court action is necessary to insure a 
complete and adequate remedy for the plaintiff. Although a court's 
award of damages would conflict in principle with an agency's grant of 
what former CAB Chairman Hector, as well as many other commentators, urged. See 
Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commission, 69 YALE. 
L.J. 931, 953-57 (1969). 
88. See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra. 
89. Note the example of class actions, as discussed at notes 15, 16 and accompany-
ing text, supra. 
90. Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 290-91 (1922). 
91. Convisser, supra note 14, at 325, argues that there is no inherent reason why 
inconsistent court and agency judgments could not peacefully co-exist, and that the actual 
chance of inconsistency is comparatively small. 
92. See Sovern, Section 301 and the Primary Jurisdiction of the NLRB, 76 HARV. L. 
REV. 529, 549-50 (1963). As Sovern aptly points out, the NLRB and the federal courts 
often decide similar issues as to employees' rights. 
93. In Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 213-18 
(D.N.J. 1951), the court held that it could award treble damages in an antitrust suit, 
since the CAB could not act retrospectively. 
94. In Carnation Co. v. Pacific Westbound Conf., 383 U.S. 213, 220-22 (1966), the 
Court held that although a case had to be referred to the Federal Maritime Commission 
for an initial decision, a grant of immunity would not be retroactive and that the district 
court should retain jurisdiction to adjudicate any antitrust violations occurring before the 
Board's immunization. 
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immunity, a finn cannot reasonably expect immunity until it has secured 
all necessary fonnal authorization.95 Finally, a court should maintain 
jurisdiction where agency action is speculative for any reason-for 
example, where the agency may decide not to act,96 the agency may lack 
an appropriate procedure,97 or the agency is involved in general rule-
making on the sUbject.9s Indeed, courts should separate out adminis-
trative questions and retain jurisdiction over judicial issues as well as 
ultimate relief.99 A court thus should require an agency to show 
specific areas of potential conflict among remedies. 
In utilizing these seven possible considerations, a court must use a 
procedurally fair means to develop necessary data. As will be discussed 
later,100 a court should request an agency to give detailed and specific 
reasons as to why it should have jurisdiction. A court also should 
insure that all interested parties know of any agency recommendation 
and receive a full opportunity to comment on it. 
These general considerations as to judicial deference are complex and 
often divergent. It simply is impossible to create any simple checklist to 
guide courts, agencies, or parties. Nevertheless, courts should retreat 
from their sometimes blind adherence to general precepts like "exper-
tise" and "uniformity." Rather, courts should make a detailed and 
independent inquiry into each factor's applicability. 
B. Specific Situations in Which Judicial 
Action may not be Appropriate 
As noted at the beginning of this Section, a court's decision to defer 
should be based not only on the general considerations of court/ agency 
relations, but also on the specific situation before the court. Although it 
is impossible to create pigeonholes, it nevertheless is useful to distinguish 
some of the most common-and commonly confused-situations. The 
95. For a discussion of whether a finn actually must have secured approval from an 
agency in order to be immunized, see text accompanying notes 46-48 supra. 
96. In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973), the Court thus 
noted that any conflict between an injunction to interconnect gas lines and a possible 
future FPC order would be decided "as, if, and when the Commission denies the 
interconnection and the District Court nevertheless undertakes to direct it." [d. at 377. 
See also World Airways, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 349 F.2d 1007, 1011 (1st Cir. 
1965). 
97. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,405-06 (1970); Local 139, Amalgamated 
Meat CUtter & Butcher Workmen v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 687 (1965). 
98. E.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 544-46 (D.C. Cir. 1975), 
rev'd 44 U.S.L.W. 4803 (1976). The court of appeals there emphasized the fact, how-
ever, that plaintiff's general interests already were well represented in the rulemaking 
proceeding. Presumably if a party did not have such effective representation, a court 
would be less willing to defer. 
99. This is generally the case with true primary jurisdiction. See text surrounding 
note 122 infra. 
100. See text accompanying note 159 infra. 
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following analysis thus categorizes situations on the basis of the type of 
jurisdictional issue involved. 
1. Judicial Interpretation of Statutory Exemptions 
The most common and convenient method of removing judicial juris-
diction is simply a statute barring actions against an industry or group of 
industries. This situation arises most frequently in the context of the 
antitrust laws, since treble damages or divestiture have the greatest 
potential impact upon the industries which federal agencies regulate. 
To be sure, statutory exemptions exist for causes of action other than 
antitrust violations. But precisely because of the antitrust laws' poten-
tial impact,10l most exemptions focus on the antitrust laws. l02 
Because of the powerful policy forces at work, any analysis of statuto-
ry exemptions must employ broad standards. First, the clarity of an 
exemption's language is obviously important. Although courts always 
have been ingenious at twisting statutory language to make sense, 
statutes can nevertheless compel irrational results if clearly expressed. 
Certainly, the Court has given lip-service to a presumption against 
implied repeals ever since Abilene.los But at the same time, under the 
"pervasive regulation" theory,104 it has been willing to imply repeals 
quite readily. Although a court should honor the clear intent of a 
coordinate branch, it need not display absolute fealty. Where a statuto-
ry provision is at all ambiguous, a court should construe it against the 
drafter. 105 
Assuming that statutory language leaves room for judicial construc-
tion, as it practically always does, a second consideration should be the 
potentially detrimental impact of the challenged conduct. In consider-
ing this question, however, a court should look not to the general 
activity of the firm or industry in question, but rather to the particular 
conduct at issue. As the Court itself has recognized,106 a statute 
sometimes immunizes an organization's existence but not all its activi-
ties. In examining the potential harm of challenged conduct, a court 
should attempt to pinpoint the precise danger to consumers, other firms, 
and overall social interests, such as the introduction or promotion of new 
technology. A court should be particularly sensitive to any possibility 
that conduct will reduce the number of firms in a field, in light of the 
101. See United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188,199-200 (1939). 
102. Walden, Antitrust in the Positive State, 41 TEXAS L. REv. 741, 767-88 (1963). 
103. Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 437 (1907). 
104. See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra. 
105. See generally Schwartz, Legal Restriction, supra note 28, at 437. 
106. In Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association v. United States, 362 U.S. 
458, 466-70 (1960), the Court held that although the Capper-Volstead Act, 7 U.S.C. 
§ 291 (1972), allowed agricultural producers to form otherwise illegal trade associa-
tions, it did not authorize them to engage in other illegal activities. 
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national commitment to preservation of atomistic industries.107 More-
over, a court should examine not just the potential dangers, but also the 
past activities of a firm or industry. Although conduct may seem 
comparatively innocuous, a page of history may show that it has been 
used improperly in the past. 
On the other hand, a third consideration in a court's assessment of the 
applicability of a statutory exemption is whether the allegedly illegal 
conduct is essential to some supervening public interest. Manufacturers 
may need to be free to exchange price information about anti-pollution 
equipment, for example, in order to expedite adoption of more effective 
devices;108 or mergers of competing railroads may be essential in order 
to guarantee efficient service.109 Although the antitrust laws are organ-
ic in nature, a more recently expressed public policy can override them. 
And in attempting to establish a particular conduct's potential benefits 
as well as detriments, a court should not just make predictions. Once 
again, it should examine any available data on past experience with the 
industry and the conduct. If a firm or industry has abused its exempt 
status in the past, a court should be hesitant to extend an exemption. 
Another consideration is whether any agency has jurisdiction over the 
firm or industry in question. Congress often cre'ates a new regulatory 
agency or vests new jurisdiction in an existing agency at the same time 
that it grants a statutory exemption. And although an agency's stan-
dards probably will differ from those of the antitrust laws, an agency 
nevertheless offers some protection to the public interest. The mere 
existence of an agency, however, does not militate in favor of an 
exemption. A court should examine an agency's power and willingness 
to enforce its version of the public interest. Although this inquiry 
requires examination of an agency's policies and attitudes, some courts 
have done SO.110 A court thus should deal not with generalities, but 
rather with the experience of the agency. 
2. Immunization of Conduct Through Agency Approval 
Because agency immunizations are similar to statutory exemptions,111 
most of the considerations relevant to the latter also apply to the former. 
107. The leading case for this proposition, of course, is Brown >Shoe Co. v. United 
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). But since Brown the Court has expanded the scope of this 
policy even further, by preventing conglomerate mergers or mergers of even vaguely 
potential competitors. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 563 (1967). 
108. See R. POSNER, ANTITRUST 319-20 (1974). 
109. See Phillips, Railroad Mergers: Competition, Monopoly, and Antitrust, 19 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 14 et seq. (1962). 
110. See, e.g., United States Alkali Export Ass'n v. United States, 325 U.S. 196, 205-
07 (1945); McCleneghan v. Union Stock Yards Co., 298 F.2d 659, 669-70 (8th Cir. 
1962). 
111. See text accompanying notes 8-10 supra. 
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A court therefore must parse the language of an agency's enabling 
statute in order to determine whether the agency has immunization 
power in the first place. There is clearly little benefit in allowing an 
agency to order immunization if the agency lacks the necessary power in 
the first place. And in deciding whether an agency has immunization 
power, a court also should consider the other factors relevant to statuto-
ry exemptions-i.e., impact of the conduct, social need for the conduct, 
and competence of the agency to police the public interest. A court 
should weigh overall benefit and detriment just as in the statutory 
exemption situation. In both cases, freedom from liability is the result 
of a theoretically reasoned and open legislative process. To be sure, 
agencies may devote more study to their decisions and may be subject to 
less pressure. These differences are not only impossible to document, 
however, but also are probably de minimis. On the other hand, many 
judges are quite aware when an agency has been "captured,"112 and in 
such cases a court obviously may scrutinize an immunization rather 
closely. 
Even if an agency has the authority to immunize the challenged 
conduct, a firm should be ex,pected to make a reasonable attempt to 
secure the agency's formal approval. Both courts and commentators 
are divided over this question. Some maintain that a firm must have 
received approval, while others feel that an agency should be free to 
grant retroactive immunity.11II Although each position has merit, there 
is a middle ground: holding firms to a "reasonable corporation" stan-
dard. A court thus should require a firm to have secured formal agency 
action where a firm knew or should have known that it needed to apply 
for approval. A court thus might excuse a small firm which has limited 
legal resources and operates in an unclear area of the law, while it might 
impose a far stricter standard on a large corporation with house counsel. 
As with statutory exemptions, agency immunizations raise a number 
of highly complex questions. No definitive guide exists for courts, 
agencies, or parties. Nevertheless, a court can add to the rationality of 
the decisionmaking process by scrutinizing the reason for an agency's or 
firm's action. 
3. Primary Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Under primary exclusive jurisdiction, a court has no power to try a 
case and an agency has the only authority to make an initial decision. 
The courts thus can intervene only on judicial review-an obviously 
limited role. Moreover, primary exclusive jurisdiction allows an agency 
to apply its own statutory standards, which may differ radically from 
112. See text accompanying notes 71, 72 supra. 
113. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra. 
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common law or other statutory law. This is particularly true in anti-
trust cases, since an agency's last concern usually is to enforce competi-
tion among the firms which it regulates. To the extent that administra-
tive and judicial legal standards differ, primary exclusive jurisdiction 
deprives a plaintiff of rights just as effectively as a statutory exemption 
or an agency immunization. 11• The only difference-and one of cold 
comfort to potential plaintiffs-is that the agency theoretically must 
consider initiating a proceeding. All too often, however, the agency's 
remedy is ei,the,r functionally inadequate or merely prospective. 
Thus, a court should first consider the impact of an agency's legal 
standards on the parties. As noted before,115 a party effectively may 
lose all rights by being shunted into an agency. Since this amounts to a 
de facto negation of major statutory rights, it should not be taken 
lightly. WI Therefore, a court should request an agency to show the 
precise legal standards applicable to a case. A court should not seek an 
advisory opinion on the merits of a case. But it may request an agency 
to set forth the applicable precedents or regulations before deciding to 
refer a case or issue. 
Similarly, a court should consider the effect of an agency's capacity to 
give an effective remedy. Even if an agency applies the same legal test 
as a court, its inability to give an adequate remedy may effectively 
negate a party's rights. A court thus should inquire into the amount, 
type, and practicality of agency relief. A court should not send a 
plaintiff seeking damages to an agency which cannot award them.1l7 
Similarly, a party should not be forced into an agency which can award 
only prospective equitable relief where other relief is sought. ll8 And 
finally, a court should examine the feasibility of potential agency relief. 
Although an agency theoretically may have sufficient power, as a practi-
cal matter it may be unable to act. 119 And even if an agency has 
appropriate remedial powers, it simply may invoke its discretion not to 
use them. Again, therefore, a court should scrutinize an agency's 
willingness as well as capability to enforce its mandate. 
A third and countervailing consideration, however, is the possible 
social value of the challenged conduct. As in the case of statutory 
114. See text accompanying note 34 supra. 
115. See note 28 and text surrounding notes 49, 50 supra. 
116. Schwartz implies that primary exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate only where 
the agency would apply the same law as the court. Ct. Schwartz, Primary lurisdiction, 
supra note 14, at 499. 
117. C/. Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156, 162 (1922). 
118. See Schwartz, Primary lurisdiction, supra note 14, at 509. 
119. See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 327-30 
(1963) (Brennan & Warren, n., dissenting). The dissent criticized the C'.ourt for 
ignoring the CAB's pleas that it simply could not enforce divestiture adequately through 
cease and desist orders. 
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exemptions,120 some supervening public interest may justify agency 
immunization. If this type of social value can justify negation of legal 
rights, presumably it also can justify limitation of such rights by forcing 
a party into an agency. 
Finally, a court should consider the scope of judicial review on a 
possible appeal from agency action. A broad scope of review makes 
primary exclusive jurisdiction far more tolerable. It allows a reviewing 
court partially to correct the pro-industry biases of a "captured" agency, 
even though the reviewing court cannot award relief as completely as a 
trial court. A trial court obviously cannot be sure that another court 
will apply incisive review. But as courts become increasingly aware of 
how an agency actually operates,121 they can at least make an educated 
guess as to a reviewing court's attitude. 
4. Primary Jurisdiction 
Under true primary jurisdiction, the court retains jurisdiction to ren-
der the ultimate decision as well as relief, refers one or more issues to the 
agency, and then takes the agency's action for what it deems it is 
worth. 122 Although true primary jurisdiction has existed for decades, a 
vital fea-ture still is unclear-namely, the extent of a court's freedom to 
ignore an agency's decision. A court theoretically should be able to 
treat an agency decision merely as an advisory opinion, since the agen-
cy's role in many ways resembles that of a referee. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court appears to require the same substantial evidence rule as 
on judicial review.123 Since the Court presumably has reasons similar 
to those behind the substantial evidence rule, such as not interfering 
with another body's factfinding, a court might be able to preserve broad 
review powers by requesting the agency merely to render a legal opin-
ion, not to make findings of fact. This approach might convert the 
review into one of law, in which a court has great latitude.124 
The first and most vital consideration in a primary jurisdiction situa-
tion is the relevance to the case of the issue which the court is consider-
ing whether to refer. The less relevant an issue, the less is the need for 
referral. Although the courts have developed virtually no standards for 
determining when an issue requires referral, a court should nevertheless 
examine an issue's relation to the disposition of the case. What seems at 
first glance to be a major question may on 'analysis tum out to be 
120. See text accompanying notes 108, 109 supra. 
121. See note 110 and accompanying text supra. 
122. >See text accompanying notes 51·58 supra. 
123. Cf, General Am. Tank Car Corp. v. EI Dorado Terminal Co., 308 U.S. 422, 
432-33 (1940). See also Locust Cartage Co. v. Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc., 430 
F.2d 334, 341 (1st Cir. 1970). 
124. See Red Ball Motor Freight, Inc. v. Shannon, 377 U.S. 311 (1964). 
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comparatively minor or separable. And since referral delays litigation, 
a court should not entertain any broad presumption in its favor. Rath-
er, a court must make this determination, on the basis of its own 
expertise. Since courts are experts in analysis of causes of action, only a 
court should determine the relevance of a particular issue. Accordingly, 
an agency has virtually no role to play in this decision. 
A court also should weigh the need for expertise in deciding an issue, 
regardless of the issue's alleged relevance or irrelevance. Where an 
issue is within a court's traditional competence-e.g., construing statuto-
ry language or settling controverted factual issues-a court should feel 
comparatively free to retain jurisdiction. And courts obviously have 
special competence in deciding issues of fundamental rights, such as the 
adequacy of a hearing. 125 
Furthermore, a court should consider its ability to review the agency 
action after a referral. A court should consider structuring a referral so 
that the court can review any agency decision as a question of law. To 
the extent that a court is able to assure itself a broad scope of future 
review, it can feel somewhat freer in referring an issue. 
Finally, a court must be sure that an agency will render its opinion 
speedily and fairly. Since a referral delays litigation, a court should 
require an agency to assure speedy action. Similarly, a court should 
require an agency to demonstrate that its decisionmaking process pro-
vides adequate procedural safeguards. 
True primary jurisdiction thus can be a highly effective mechanism 
for coordinating the skills of courts and agencies. If properly struc-
tured, a referral can draw on agency expertise and yet not impair 
judicial jurisdiction. Precisely for these reasons, courts should have an 
operational bias in favor of true primary-as opposed to primary exclu-
sive-jurisdiction. Unless both statutory and policy considerations 
mandate a finding of primary exclusive jurjsdiction, a court should 
resolve any ambiguity in favor of true primary jurisdiction. 
Jurisdictional issues thus are sufficiently complex to defy the creation 
of a laundry list of relevant factors. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
separate out some issues and considerations. To be sure, the above 
factors are general in nature and will not yield facile decisionmaking. 
Nevertheless, by considering the general nature of court-agency relations 
and the specific nature of such situations, the relevant considerations at 
least may become more visible and structured. 
125. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 361-65 (1963); 
Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941-43 (5th Cir. 
1971), eert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972). 
1976] PRIMARY JURISDICTION 
III. CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE 
AND POSSIBLE REFORM 
891 
As noted at the beginning, many commentators have done excellent 
analyses of the cases on "primary jurisdiction," but few have explored 
the pragmatic implications for agencies. Accordingly, an examination 
of actual agency practices appears in order-even through the quasi-
empirical means of interviews with prominent agency legal staff mem-
bers.126 
At any given time, any federal agency probably is involved in com-
paratively few jurisdictional issues. Indeed, the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission reported that it had never encountered a jurisdictional 
issue. Most complainants apparently attack NRC licensees by filing a 
complaint with the Commission and appealing any adverse agency 
action.121 Other agencies indicated that they handled perhaps one or 
two jurisdictional questions per year. 128 Accordingly, these doctrines 
apparently operate on a very individualized and ad hoc basis. A court 
will deal with anyone agency very infrequently, thus preventing devel-
opment of judicial expertise. As noted in Section II, a court therefore 
must take' care to elicit the details of an agency's regulatory program. 
Agencies get notice of potential jurisdictional issues in different ways. 
While some have internal procedures for discovering potentially relevant 
cases,129 others, such as the FCC,130 learn only from their licensees. The 
126. See Appendix for a description of the study. 
127. Interview with members of Office of General Counsel, Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, in Washingon, D.C., March 4, 1975. This estimate includes cases involv-
ing the former Atomic Energy Commission, since the staff members interyiewed simply 
had been transferred from one agency to another. 
The staff members were somewhat puzzled themselves as to the absence of these 
jurisdictional issues, although they frankly said that they never had thought about the 
question before. Upon reflection, they decided that the reason for the lack of these 
issues probably was that private parties had few if any direct causes of action against 
operators of reactors and other nuclear devices. Indeed, all such state remedies may be 
preempted under Northern State Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (Sth Cir. 
1971), a/I'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1973). And they expressed absolutely no interest in 
assuming exclusive jurisdiction, even on the somewhat questionable assumption that the 
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5S01 et seq. (Supp. 1976), created 
such jurisdiction. They felt that antitrust issues should be iitigated before the federal 
courts. 
12S. Interview with members of Office of General Counsel, Federal Communications 
Commission, in Washington, D.C., October 21, 1974 [hereinafter cited as FCC 
Interview]; interview with member of Office of General Counsel, Federal Maritime 
Commission, July IS, 1975, in Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited as FMC Interview]. 
Interestingly enough, the ICC encounters dozens of jurisdictional issues every year, but 
has little trouble in processing them-perhaps precisely because it has lived with the 
problem since Abilene in 1907. Interview with member of Office of General Counsel, 
Interstate Commerce Commission, July 1, 1975, in Washington, D.C. [hereinafter cited 
as ICC Interview]. See text accompanying notes 12-23 supra. 
129. SEC Interview, supra note 62. 
130. FCC Interview, supra note 12S; FMC Interview, supra note 12S. Neither 
commission undertakes an affirmative effort to uncover cases in which it potentially has 
exclusive, primary, or preemptive jurisdiction. In fact, very often the first and only 
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SEC provides a particularly interesting illustration of internal agency 
monitoring. The Office of General Counsel searches appropriate trade 
and legal literature for potentially relevant litigation;13l and since the 
Division of Corporate Finance naturally reviews all proxy, registration, 
and annual statements, it refers to the General Counsel's office any 
potentially relevant litigation.132 The practices of the FCC and SEC 
thus differ radically. To a certain extent, this results from the SEC's 
greater access to information. At the same time, 'the two agencies 
simply differ as to their concern with intervening in relevant private 
litigation. ISS 
Agencies also differ as to the factors which they consider in deciding 
whether to file in a case and assert jurisdiction. Some agencies appar-
ently look to the comparatively abstract policy ques'tion of a case's 
potential impact upon their regulatory programs.134 Other agencies 
appear more concerned with the effect of asserting jurisdiction upon 
their continuing relationships with courts. lS5 
Perhaps more important, procedures for dealing with private litigants 
also vary from agency to agency. Some agencies will discuss filing an 
amicus brief with one party and never notify the opposing party.IS6 
Other agencies either notify both sides that they are considering a 
notice of such a case will come in the form of a request for referral or advice from a 
state or federal court. 
131. SEC Interview, supra note 62. 
132. Interview with member of Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and Ex-
change Commission, in Washington, D.C., December 4, 1974. When the Division 
uncovers a potentially interesting case, it either may send a memorandum or simply 
"hand-carry the file" to the General Counsel's Office. The Division does not have any 
definite guidelines as to what cases may be relevant, but has an apparently effective 
"general understanding in the office." [d. 
133. Although there is a natural temptation to look for different levels of competence 
at different agencies, the difference in concern more likely is the result of the impact of 
private litigation. A lawsuit against a single television station has little effect on the 
FCC's more than 7,500 broadcast licensees. A lawsuit against the New York Stock 
Exchange, however, can affect the nation's entire financial status. 
134. The SEC apparently looks to whether a case presents a new and important issue 
and whether the court definitely will decide the issue one way or another. It prefers to 
avoid "cases with substantial unresolved factual controversies" and to enter as an amicus 
at the court of appeals level. SEC Interview, supra note 62. The NLRB is "highly 
sensitized to the proposition that there are daily labor proceedings independent of NLRB 
jurisdiction" and thus at least will appear in any case with a potential conflict. Interview 
with members of Office of General Counsel, National Labor Relations Board, in 
Washington, D.C., March 4, 1975 [hereinafter cited as NLRB Interview]. One problem 
with this approach, a staff member noted, is that in federal district court enforcement of 
collective bargaining contracts the General Counsel's Office may be "notified two 
minutes before the hearing" and thus have to make a very speedy appearance without 
prior presentation to the Board. 
135. CAB Interview, supra note 45. On the other hand, the Commission apparently 
feels free simply to refuse to file any kind of brief at all, where it feels that the issue is 
solely one of law. FCC Interview, supra note 128. 
136. FCC Interview, supra note 128; CAB Interview, supra note 45. 
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filing,187 or simply refuse to talk to either party after learning about the 
litigation. ISS In all agencies, however, there appears to be little or no 
contact between private parties and agency members. ISO 
The agencies also differ substantially in the extent to which the staffs 
consult agency members about asserting jurisdiction. In some agencies, 
the staff adopts a position and files a brief without ever consulting the 
agency members. Indeed, the agency members may learn of the filing 
only when they receive copies of the brief afterward. 140 Other agencies 
have informal discussions between staff and members before taking any 
position.l41 Still other agencies make both formal and informal presen-
tations to agency members, depending upon the nature and urgency of 
the case.142 
Even though it has approved the filing of a brief, an agency often 
must get clearance from the Department of Justice or the Solicitor 
General in order to file in some courts. Several agencies reported snarls 
137. NLRB Interview, supra note 134. Several staff members indicated that they 
were "very scrupulous ... to get the view of the other side before acting." Very often, 
however, they are able to do so simply by means of a telephone call-a simple procedure 
which usually satisfies both the agency and the private party. 
The ICC has the rather interesting technique of forcing a meeting of all parties, if its 
staff decides that a discussion of the merits would be worthwhile. ICC Interview, supra 
note 128. 
138. SEC Interview, supra note 62. Staff members will not talk with private parties 
"beyond the preliminary stage" of investigating the litigation at issue. 
139. [d. Both staff and members of the agency attempt to discourage such contacts. 
This attitude apparently is unknown at the FCC. FCC Interview, supra note 128. 
140. FCC Interview, supra note 128. The General Counsel's Office consults with the 
bureau which has primary responsibility for a day-to-day regulation of the' industry in 
question. If the General Counsel's Office and a bureau disagree, they then take their 
differences to the Commission for ultimate resolution. And the staff always informs the 
Commission after a court actually has made a referral. The FPC follows a similar 
procedure. Interview with members of Office of General Counsel, Federal Power 
Commission, in Washington, D.C., July 15, 1975 [hereinafter cited as FPC Interview]. 
141. SEC Interview, supra note 62. The staff will circulate a memorandum outlining 
the proposed agency position to Commission members before drafting a final brief. 
Sometimes the Commission will discuss the issue and sometimes the individual Commis-
sioners simply give their informal approval. The FMC follow a similar pattern. FMC 
Interview, supra note 128. 
142. NLRB Interview, supra note 134. If the staff of the General Counsel's Office 
finds that "time is tight," they will "rush the matter down to the oral agenda of the 
Board." If there is not even time for this, the staff will appear in court and assert the 
agency's interest in the case, "but not suggest any affirmative position." When the 
Board is not sitting as an entity, the staff will attempt to get authorization from three 
individual members-a majority of the Board. As one staff member commented, it is 
"curiously easy to find three Board members if you really want to." And where time 
allows, the staff will circulate a proposed statement to the full Board and have formal 
discussion if the Board wants it. One staff member noted that the General Counsel's 
Office had considerable discretion for two reasons: first, with more than 300 briefs a 
year "the volume of litigation makes it impossible for the Board to review each 
carefully"; and second, the Office has grown to "enjoy the confidence of the Board in 
very great measure." [d. 
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at this point in the process when either the Justice Department or the 
Solicitor General disagrees with the agency position.14S 
Aside from the mechanics of filing, it is interesting to note the type of 
arguments which agencies make. Some agencies include fairly detailed 
discussions of the pragmatic and policy problems which would result if a 
court did not grant the agency jurisdiction.144 This appears highly 
useful, since this type of information otherwise may not be available to a 
court. On the other hand, some agencies argue general theories of 
jurisdiction.145 This approach appears to be largely an exercise in 
futility, since the litigants presumably brief these issues and a court 
certainly makes its own legal analysis. Accordingly, the former style of 
brief probably is more useful. 
As the above review indicates, the agencies have different procedures 
for considering and asserting jurisdictional issues. While this· diversity 
reinforces the conclusion that jurisdictional decisions must be highly ad 
hoc, it also suggests the possibility of procedural reform at the adminis-
trative level. 
As the "above review also indicates, there are problems in the agen-
cies' treatment of jurisdictional issues. To be sure, the most useful 
change would be judicial clarification of the doctrines. In light of the 
doctrines' very confused nature, however, this seems unlikely. 
On the other hand, there is room for minor but hopefully useful 
reforms in the agencies' procedures for dealing with jurisdictional issues. 
These changes might enable agencies to interact more effectively with 
courts, and improve the flow of information between agencies and 
courts, thus producing more reasoned judicial decisions. 
First, there should be some system for informing agencies that a 
jurisdictional issue has been raised. Agencies thus should use discre-
tionary means to inform courts of their interest in certain jurisdictional 
issues. 146 Agencies could use methods as diverse as direct mail, 
143. [d. In some cases, the Solicitor General simply will reject the NLRB's position 
and either refuse to file a brief or file a brief with the NLRB's position "in a footnote." 
And where there is substantial disagreement among several federal agencies, the Solicitor 
General may file a brief and allow the NLRB to file a separate brief on its own. See also 
FMC Interview, supra note 128. The SEC tries to work with the Justice Department 
from the initial decision to file and has experienced some difficulty with the Solicitor 
General. SEC Interview, supra note 62. The FCC appears to have had a similar ex-
perience. FCC Interview, supra note 128. 
144. See, e.g., Brief for CAB as Amicus Curiae at 22-28, Nader v. Allegheny 
Airlines, 412 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd 44 U.S.L.W. 4803 (1976); Brief for SEC 
as Amicus Curiae at 6-20, Thill v. New York Stock. Exch., 433 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971). 
145. See, e.g., Motion to Intervene for NLRB at 6-9, International Bhd. of Teamsters 
V. Ace Enterprises, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 36 (S.D. Cal. 1971); Brief for NLRB as Amicus 
Curiae at 11-13, Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. R.R. & Motor Coach Employees V. 
Lockridge, 404 U.S. 874 (1970). 
146. This suggestion ties in closely with the possibility of agency policy statements on 
jurisdictional issues. See discussion at text accompanying notes 160-62 infra. 
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publication in the Federal Register, statements in legal publications, or 
cooperation with bar and judiciary groups. This approach is consistent 
with the established view that courts should elicit agency views where 
potentially relevant. 147 It is impossible to describe this type of system in 
very precise terms, simply because the definition of a relevant jurisdic-
tional issue is so vague. Indeed, two agencies favored this kind of 
approach,148 while two opposed it,149 ,thus indicating at least some 
agency support. 
A second reform would be the creation of a uniform referral system 
in primary exclusive or primary jurisdiction cases. As previously not-
ed,150 there currently is a complete absence of standards in this area as 
to both the form and content of the referral order. Indeed, there often 
is considerable dispute about referring an issue to an agency or simply 
dismissing a case outright and allowing the plaintiff to commence 
proceedings before an agency. Dismissal seems inappropriate in a true 
primary jurisdiction situation.15l But in cases of primary exclusive 
jurisdiction, at least some agency staffers prefer an outright dismissal on 
the interesting ground that it prevents any mistakes in a possible referral 
order.152 Although none of the agencies seemed to have terribly strong 
feelings on this point, some staff members did complain about receiving 
incoherent or irrelevant referrals.153 
Further, agencies should create internal clearinghouses to monitor 
possibly relevant litigation. It obviously is impossible to specify anyone 
system for all agencies, since agencies differ not only as to structure and 
resources but also as to availability of information.154 Nevertheless, 
agencies should designate staff members to review existing information 
and require the industries within their authority to submit more infor-
mation. None of the agencies felt that this type of system was particu-
larly essential, and one agency actively opposed the idea. m 
The fourth, probably most important, and clearly most controversial, 
reform is that agencies ban ex parte contacts and allow all affected 
147. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406-07 (1970). See also Kestenbaum, 
supra note 4, at 819-20. 
148. SEC Interview, supra note 62; FCC Interview, supra note 128. The FCC staff 
particularly complained about the difficulty of getting relevant pleadings in a reasonable 
amount of time. They thought that better communications would ease this problem, 
since courts would understand agencies' needs better. 
149. NLRB Interview, supra note 134; CAB Interview, supra note 45. Both sets of 
staff members thought such statements would be misunderstood. 
150. See text accompanying notes 61, 62 supra. 
151. See text accompanying note 58 supra. 
152. ICC Interview, supra note 128. 
153. ICC Interview, supra note 128; FMC Interview, supra note 128. 
154. The very structure of the SEC insures that it receives comprehensive informa-
tion about litigation activities probably relevant to it. See note 132 and accompanying 
text. 
1.55. CAB Interview, supra note 45. One staff member simply felt that a clearing-
house was totally unnecessary because the agency already received sufficient notification 
from its regulated firms. 
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parties to submit written and possibly oral comments before an agency 
decides to assert jurisdiction. The plan would require an agency in its 
discretion to hold a minature oral argument before making a decision. 
This requirement seems only fair in light of the previously discussed 
outcome-determinative effect of exclusive or primary jurisdiction 156 and 
an agency's persuasive weight with a court. After all, if an agency 
asserts jurisdiction successfully, it has the same effect upon a plaintiff as 
an outright dismissal or at least a stay. Since no court would take such 
drastic action without a full hearing, an agency should apply a similar 
standard where its influence may bring about the same result. Given 
the fact that jurisdictional issues arise quite rarely,157 this requirement 
would not impose an undue burden upon agencies. Nevertheless, agen-
cy personnel uniformly and bitterly opposed such a requirement. The 
typical reactions were that it would create a huge "hassle," add nothing 
to the decision process, involve pure questions of law, impinge upon the 
agency's litigation strategy, or generally create unnecessary work.H8 
None of these reasons seems persuasive, however, in light of the compar-
ative scarcity of jurisdictional issues. It does not seem unreasonable to 
ask that an agency spend several hours once or twice a year reading or 
listening to arguments which may affect a litigant's right to judicial relief 
sometimes running to millions of dollars. 
Fifth, the agencies' amicus briefs should address themselves to prag-
matic considerations, rather than just the general law of jurisdiction. As 
noted,169 some agency briefs give courts absolutely nothing in terms of 
the agency's supposed expertise. If an agency indeed has sufficient 
expertise to justify jurisdiction, it at least should demonstrate this to a 
court in some detail. 
Finally, agencies should promulgate general policy statements, outlin-
ing the areas in which they believe they have jurisdiction and the 
circumstances under which they would assert it. These policy state-
ments would be analogous to the Justice Department's merger guide-
lines.16o To be sure, these statements could hardly be any more precise 
than are the Justice Department's. Nevertheless, the statements at worst 
would let litigants know that an agency might raise a jurisdictional issue, 
and at best might give litigants a reasonably accurate forecast of an 
agency's position. The agencies did not appear to have any strong 
feeling on this subject at all. One agency felt that the statements would 
156. See note 28 and text surrounding notes 49, 50 supra. 
157. See text accompanying notes 126-28 supra. 
158. One staff member rather pithily noted that "regulatory agencies are too god-
damned slow as it is," and that a mini-hearing would take "three or six months to do." 
FMC Interview, supra note 128. 
159. See note 145 and accompanying text supra. 
160. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, 1 CCH Tlw>E REG. REp. 11 4510 
( 1968). 
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be useless, because of their necessarily general nature.l6l Another 
agency thought the statements could be helpful, however, in at least a 
limited way.162 Indeed, at least one agency already has taken action 
along these lines. In a Statement Concerning Referrals of Private Liti-
gation,163 the Commodity Futures Trading Commission attempted to 
outline in general terms the scope of its jurisdiction and the types of 
cases in which referral would be worthwhile. Moreover, the Commis-
sion invited courts to seek its assistance by way of amicus filings. 
CONCLUSION 
As noted at the outset, none of these proposals is exactly earthshak-
ing. But the major problems lie in the substantive law, which is not 
likely to change in the short term. To the extent that jurisdictional 
determinations are somewhat ad hoc, however, better communications 
between agency and court will result in better judicial decisionmaking. 
The recommendations hopefully would improve these communications. 
The law of "primary jurisdiction" has been and still is in a state of 
confusion. Precisely because of the partially ad hoc nature of jurisdic-
tional determinations, judicial relief is not likely to materialize in the 
near future. Indeed, the Supreme Court's greatest contribution simply 
might be to acknowledge the highly individualized nature of its deci-
sions. The proposed considerations discussed in Section II would lead 
the courts to undertake more searching inquiries as to the pragmatic 
bases for agency jurisdiction in each case, hopefully resulting in more 
reasoned, albeit more individualized, judicialdecisionmaking. 
The chaotic state of the law has placed the agencies in a difficult 
position, as shown by the diversity of methods by which they handle 
jurisdictional issues. Since each agency faces only a few jurisdictional 
problems at a time, however, no one agency has any particular incentive 
to search for better methods of dealing with them. The agencies thus 
have responded chaotically to a chaotic situation. 
A combination of more rigorous judicial inquiry and more efficient 
agency participation would prove highly useful in deciding jurisdictional 
issues. To be sure, the proposals for courts in Section II and for 
agencies in Section III will not solve the underlying tensions between 
regulation and competition, agencies and courts. Nevertheless, they can 
go a long way toward easing an admittedly difficult situation. 
161. FCC Interview, supra note 128. The staff member felt that policy statements 
could not cover the Commission's broad regulatory programs and could not take account 
of "unknown jurisdiction." To a certain extent, this feeling also may reflect the FCC's 
unhappy past experience with policy statements. See, e.g., Botein, Comparative Broad-
cast Licensing Procedures and the Rule 0/ Law: A Fuller Investigation, 6 GA. L. REV. 
743,751-53 (1972). 
162. SEC Interview, supra note 62. The staff member expressed some fear, however, 
that overly specific policy statements would lead to inflexibility. 
163. 41 Fed. Reg. 1847'1 (1976). 
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APPENDIX 
METHODOLOGY OF AGENCY INTERVIEWS 
From the beginning of the study, it seemed more profitable as well as 
more practicable to focus on the interaction between jurisdictional doc-
trines and administrative procedures. Accordingly, the author decided 
that at least a quasi-empirical study of agencies' internal processes was 
essential. 
As the body of the article indicates, the study was inherently limited 
and unscientific. The author originally considered the possibility of 
distributing a questionnaire to all counsel in selected cases. The next 
step would have been to keypunch the responses, create an appropriate 
computer program, and attempt to discover conceptual trends among 
agency as well as private attorneys. This approach soon proved to be 
unfeasible, however, for two main reasons. First, the complexity of 
jurisdictional issues made the drafting of uniform questionnaires virtual-
ly impossible. Such a questionnaire would have been so general as to 
make the responses useless. On the other hand, tailoring questionnaires 
to specific jurisdictional issues or cases would have produced more 
detailed, but narrower, data. 
Accordingly, the author decided to proceed by means of interviews 
with the decisionmaking personnel at each agency. In most cases, of 
course, these staff members were in each agency's office of general 
counsel. However, in some situations, as at the SEC and FCC, person-
nel in "line" operating units appeared to share responsibility and there-
fore also were interviewed. 
Since the study obviously did not allow time to interview personnel at 
more than four hundred federal agencies, it was necessary to restrict the 
size of the sample. Accordingly, the author decided to use the inde-
pendent regulatory agencies as the sample, for a variety of reasons. First, 
these agencies generally have been involved in more jurisdictionallitiga-
tion than the executive agencies, simply because most independent 
bodies regulate industries where antitrust issues often arise. Second, 
these agencies' enabling statutes are at least vaguely similar, since most 
of the agencies were created at the same time and followed the model of 
the ICC. Finally, the number of independent agencies is small enough 
to make a thorough survey of them practicable. 
The author initially approached each agency through its representa-
tive to the Administrative Conference of the United States. It usually 
was necessary to contact a number of busy agency officials in order to 
track down the appropriate personnel simply because of the comparative 
paucity of jurisdictional litigation. After making contact with the ap-
propriate personnel, the author attempted to prepare for each interview 
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by reviewing all Supreme Court and all post World War II lower federal 
court cases involving an agency. This preparation usually was of little 
help. On the one hand, some staff members were so new that they 
could not shed any light on the agency's role in many cases. On the 
other hand, more senior personnel understandably tended to have some-
what foggy memories about the policy considerations behind generation-
old litigation. This experience confirmed the previous decision that 
surveying counsel in particular cases would be useless. 
Although each interview had a definite set of objectives in terms of 
securing information, the author did not present a formal set of ques-
tions. Instead, -the author attempted to discuss each agency's general 
jurisdictional issues and ask specific questions as seemed appropriate. 
This unstructured approach ultimately was quite effective. It not only 
elicited fairly candid responses, but produced information about internal 
processes which the author previously had not realized might be rele-
vant. 
The author usually began an interview by asking agency personnel for 
their definition of "primary jurisdiction." This technique established 
the common definitional grounds necessary in light of the doctrine's 
previously discussed ambiguities. Indeed, almost every staff member 
had a different definition. This approach also created a fairly easy 
transition into a discussion of the staff members' dealings with the 
doctrine, often leading to the surprising conclusion that they actually 
cared very little. 
This in tum led appropriately into a discussion of the agency's 
methods in dealing with jurisdictional issues in litigation. The author 
attempted to elicit very specific information, inquiring into staff mem-
bers' interactions, relations between different offices and commissioners, 
procedures for presenting issues to agency members, methods of draft-
ing amicus or other filings, and relations with the Solicitor General as 
well as -the Justice Department. Discussion of specific internal proce-
dures also gave the author an opportunity to present some seemingly 
useful reforms, such as special information-gathering units, issuance of 
policy statements, imposition of ex parte rules, and the like. Staff 
members appeared to react to the proposals casually and candidly, 
probably because no formal opinions were requested and anonymity was 
guaranteed. 
After this formal discussion appeared to have produced maximum 
useful information, the author ended the interview by suggesting major 
reforms. Most importantly, at this point the author recommended that 
agencies hold miniature hearings before making any recommendation to 
courts. As noted in the article, this suggestion invariably provoked very 
negative reactions from agency employees. In fact, this suggestion 
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alone often provoked another round of highly productive general discus-
sion. 
The interviews varied in length from two to six hours, and follow-up 
telephone calls sometimes were necessary to clarify certain points or to 
contact previously unavailable staff members. On the whole, however, 
agency personnel were cooperative, helpful, and candid. 
During the first few interviews the author attempted to interview 
between three and five staff members. This number later decreased 
radically; the author increasingly found not only that personnel tended 
to be repetitive and consistent, but also that some employees resented 
the suggestion that any other staff member could add further informa-
tion. After the interviews at the first half-dozen agencies, the informa-
tion became increasingly redundant. As indicated in the article, the 
agency responses tended to follow two or three separate but similar 
lines. Frankly, the author completed the interviews with all agencies 
only for the sake of having a full sample. 
Although the results of the survey clearly did not rise to the level of 
any statistical significance, they nevertheless added a new and impor-
tant dimension to the study. At the very least, they uncovered the 
agencies' general perceptions of and internal procedures for jurisdiction-
al issues. Obviously enough, more interviews and formal questionnaires 
would add a new quantum of data. In light of the time and resources 
necessary to carry out these studies effectively, however, the benefit 
simply did not justify the cost. 
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